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ST/\TEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Rob Hall and his wife's lover, Emmett Corrigan, were involved in a physical altercation
in the parking lot of a Walgrcens in Meridian, Idaho, in March of 2011. Mr. Hall sustained a
grazing gunshot wound to his head and suffered retrograde and antcrograde amnesia
Mr. Corrigan suffered gunshot wounds to his head and chest and died at the scene. The State
charged Mr. Hall with first degree murder. Mr. Hall asserted that the homicide was justified as
he was acting in self-defense.

The jury ultimately found Mr. Hall guilty of second

degree murder.
Mr. Hall asserts there were multiple errors during his trial which deprived him of his right
to a fair trial.

First, he asserts that the district court erred in failing to give his requested

instruction on the law of justifiable homicide. Next, he asserts, as fundamental error, that the
self-defense instructions the court gave the jury incorrectly defined Idaho's justifiable homicide
law, essentially lowering the State's burden of proving the homicide was unlawful.

Third,

Mr. Hall asserts that the district court abused its discretion by denying the admission of
Facebook statements Mr. Corrigan made a few weeks or days prior to the incident, wherein
Mr. Corrigan boasted of his intent to physically assault an un-named person the jury could
reasonably conclude was Rob Hall.

Additionally, Mr. Hall asserts that the court erred in

allowing the State to present the testimony of a person who taught Mr. Hall's concealed weapons
class, as the testimony was irrelevant. Finally, Mr. Hall asserts that the accumulation of the
errors deprive him of his right to a fair trial.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Rob Hall and Kandi Hall married in 1994 and had two children, Hannah and Hailev.
,
(Tr., p.894, L.17

p.895, L.3.) 1 fn 2005, the Halls moved from California to Idaho to provide a

better Ii fe for their daughters. (Prcsentence Rep mi (hereinafter, PS 1), P. 14.) After moving to
Idaho, Mr. Hall found a job in the lT department for the Ada County Sheriff's Office. (PSf,
p.20; Tr., p.895, Ls.8-15.) Rob helped develop an emergency vehicle tracking system, and his
work performance was praised in his performance evaluations. (PSI, p.20.) His friends and
follow Sheriff's Office employees described him as quiet, low-key, and a good worker and
father.

(E.g., Tr., p.1039, L.10 · p.1041, L.6, p.1058, L.18

p.1167, L.7.)

p.1060, L.10, p.1166, L.20

But while Mr. Hall's work for the Sheriff's Office had been going well, his

relationship with Kandi became distant. (See PST, pp.15-16.)
Emmett Corrigan, his wife Ashlee Corrigan, and their four young children moved to
Idaho after Emmett finished law school. (PSI, p.5.) Mr. Corrigan then opened a law practice.
(PSI, p.5.) Beginning in October 2010, Ashlee began to have suspicions that her husband was
having an affair with one of his employees.

(Tr., p.1256, L. 18

~

p.1257, L.9.)

She asked

Emmett about those suspicions over the next few months, but he never gave her any information.
(Tr., p.1257, Ls.10-18.) By January 2011, their marriage was deteriorating. (Tr., p.1271, Ls.1721.) Emmett became very angry, and Ashlee suspected that he was drinking and using ADHD
drugs and steroids. (Tr., p.1271, L.22

p.1272, L.11.) At one point, she even searched the

garbage, looking for "anything." (Tr., p.1270, Ls.2-7.) Ashlee went to a marriage counselor a
few times, but Emmett's schedule did not allow him to attend and he was pretty defensive about
why he did not need to go. (Tr., p.1260, Ls.12-16.)

1

All citations to the transcripts in this brief are to the large two-volume transcript containing the
complete trial and sentencing.
2

The employee Ms. Corrigan suspected of having an affair with her husband was Kandi
Hall.

(Tr., p.1256, Ls.18-25.)

In September 2010, Kelly Rieker introduced Kandi to

Mr. Corrigan, who had recently taken the Bar Exam and planned to start a criminal defense firm.
(Tr., p.896, Ls.6-14.)
relationship.

Two weeks later, Emmett Corrigan and Kandi Hall began a sexual

(Tr., p.897, Ls.8-11.)

In November 2010, Ms. Hall started working for

Mr. Corrigan as a paralegal. (Tr., p.895, Ls.4-7, p.898, Ls.13-19.)
Mr. Corrigan knew that Kandi Hall was married (Tr., p.902, L.24 -- p.903, L.6), and she
knew that he was married with four children at the time (Tr., p.897, Ls.15-17). They initially
kept their affair secret, but it eventually became common knowledge among Ms. Rieker and
Christopher Search, the other employees at Mr. Corrigan's office. (Tr., p.840, L.20

p.84 l, L.3,

p.898, Ls.20-25, p.902, Ls.17-23.) Mr. Corrigan even told two of his clients that he and Kandi
were together. (Tr., p.841, Ls.6-14.)
Kandi Hall did not tell her husband about her sexual relationship with Mr. Corrigan.
(Tr., p.897, Ls.18-20.) However, by Christmas 2010, Rob Hall suspected that she may have
been having an affair.

(PSI, p.16.)

In January 2011, Rob wrote Kandi a series of emails

detailing his sadness about their declining marriage, his exasperation regarding her behavior
towards him, and his misgivings about her relationships with Emmett and one of her friends.

(See State's Exs. 52BB - 52II.)
Even though he had not yet met him, Mr. Corrigan disliked Rob Hall from the first day
he became involved with Kandi Hall, and he would constantly belittle Rob in Kandi's presence.
(Tr., p.905, L. 15 - p.906, L. 17.) He would make fun of Rob by calling him "Gob." (Tr., p.906,
Ls. 6-11.) Emmett wanted Kandi to separate from her husband, and constantly put pressure on
her to leave Rob. (Tr., p.908, Ls.17-19, p.909, L.25 -- p.910, L.4.) But Kandi wanted to stay

3

with her husband while enjoying what she had with Emmett "on the side." (Tr., p.907, L.17
p.908, L.2.)
Ms. Hall testified that she may have told Emmett that her husband was abusive towards
her (Tr., p.979, Ls.14-20), and Mr. Search testified that Kandi had claimed her husband physical
abused her.

(Tr., p.1299, Ls.2-21.) However, Kandi told the jury that Rob Hall was never

physically abusive towards her. (Tr., p.929, Ls.6-8.)
Ms. Hall further testified that she noticed that by January of 2011, Mr. Corrigan had
become more controlling and aggressive, and had a short temper at work. (Tr., p. 908, L.17 -p.909, L.23.) Mr. Search also told the jury that Emmett had a temper. (Tr., p.1244, Ls.8-9.)
When Mr. Corrigan became aggravated or upset, he would shuffle his feet like a bull.
(Tr., p.917, L. 14

p.918, LA)

Ms. Hall testified that, at one point, her husband went to Mr. Corrigan's office while she
and Emmett were at the mall, and Rob spoke with her after they returned. (Tr., p.846, Ls. 7-21.)
Rob stated that he thought Kandi was not going to lunch that day. (Tr., p.846, L.22

p.847,

L.5.) Mr. Corrigan asked if there was a problem, and Mr. Hall replied there was not and left.
(Tr., p.850, Ls.3-21.)
In late February 20 I 1, Mr. Corrigan sent Kandi Hall a late evening text message to the
effect of "I wish we were together tonight," and Mr. Hall had a phone conversation with Emmett
about why he wrote the text message. (Tr., p.851, L.14-p.853, L.1 I.) Emmett then showed up
at the Halls' house, and he and Rob talked outside. (Tr., p.854, L.6 - p.856, L.9.) Kandi saw
Emmett shuffle his feet. (Tr., p.919, Ls.4-6.) She testified that she did not witness any physical
contact between her husband and Mr. Corrigan, but Rob appeared defeated when he returned to
the house. (Tr., p.856, L.22

p.857, L.4.)

4

Mr. Search testified that Emmett told him that, during the confrontation outside the Halls'
house, Rob Hall told him to watch what he was doing or else he would have to talk with his wife
about it. (Tr., p.1244, Ls.13-19.) Mr. Corrigan felt that Rob was threatening Kandi, and stated
that Rob would be sorry ifhe ever touched her. (Tr., p.1244, Ls.20-23.) Mr. Search testified that
Emmett stated he would have no problem hurting Rob the way that Rob hurt Kandi.
(Tr., p.1244, L.24

p.1245, L.l.) Mr. Corrigan also made statements on Facebook about his

desire to fight someone with whom he had an altercation in February 2011. (Sealed Exs., p.115.)
On March 11, 2011, Mr. Corrigan and Ms. Hall met with Kevin Rogers at the Ada
County Public Defender's Office to ask questions about getting a divorce. (Tr., p.862, L.12 p.863, L.25.) Hannah Hall testified that when she came home from school that day, she saw her
father packing up his garage. (Tr., p.2457, Ls.15-23.) Mr. Hall stated that he was going to move
out, and he appeared to be sad but he was not angry. (Tr., p.2457, L.23

p.2459, L.18.)

When Kandi Hall arrived home after work that evening, she found Rob Hall loading
boxes so he could move out. (Tr., p.864, L.6

~

p.865, L.7.) Kandi then admitted she was having

an affair, but she told Rob that the affair was with an attorney in Oregon, without disclosing it
was with Mr. Corrigan. (Tr., p.866, L.12
but concerned and sad. (Tr., p.933, L.23

~

p.867, L.13.) Kandi testified that Rob was not upset,
p.934, L.7.)

When Emmett Corrigan arrived home from work that same night, Ashlee Corrigan tried
to get her husband to discuss their marriage, but Mr. Corrigan became defensive and very angry.
(Tr., p.1258, L.23

p.1259, L.25.) After Ashlee told Emmett she had been talking about their

marriage problems with her brother and sister, he yelled, "I could kill all of you." (Tr., p.1261,
L.14

~

p.1262, L.11.) When Emmett told Ashlee he was going to Walgreens to get some cough

medicine, she asked him to stay so they could work on their marriage, but he went to Walgreens

5

anyway.

(Tr., p.1266, Ls.7-18.) Mr. C01Tigan had been constantly texting Kandi Hall that

evenmg. (Tr., p.869, Ls.12-16; p.932, L.22

p.933, L.6.)

When Kandi Hall did not respond to some of Mr. Corrigan's text messages, he tcxtcd
Kandi's sister, Tina Lax, "Lol! !!! Hey Kandi just told me that she told rob she had an affair, but
with someone else.

She wont answer and I am worried.

Can u call her and check on her

please?" (State's Ex. 77 A; see Sealed Exs., p.8.) He later texted Tina, "Any word? I can't get a
hold of her. I am about ready to drive oover and beat his ass," and, "She just texted me and said
he came back. I am sitting in my truck very close to her house. I wont let his sorry ass lay a
finger on her again." (State's Ex. 77 A.) In still another text message, Mr. Corrigan asked, "How
did this shmuck even get her teen? He is such a bitch." (State's Ex. 77A.)
Rob Hall, at1er his discussion with his wifo, left their home to visit his friend Danny
Myers. (Tr., p.868, L.6

p.869, L.6.) Mr. Myers testified that Rob had a beer when he came

over, and he told Mr. Myers about his conversation with Kandi and his suspicions that she was
having an affair with Mr. Conigan. (Tr., p.1329, L. 10 -· p.1330, L.6.) However, Rob did not say
anything negative about Emmett, or express an intention to hurt him. (Tr., p.1330, Ls.11-17.)
Rob stated he was thinking of writing a letter to Ashlee Conigan about the affair. (Tr., p.1331,
Ls.8-20.) Mr. Myers told him not to do anything stupid regarding the letter. (Tr., p.1332, Ls.79.) Rob eventually stated he was going home and left. (Tr., p.1332, Ls.4-6.)
Kandi Hall left home soon after Rob did, to get a prescription at the Walgreens at the
intersection of Linder and McMillan in Meridian. (Tr., p.869, Ls.7-11.) She told Mr. Corrigan
she was heading to Walgreens, and he met her there.

(Tr., p.869, L.17 - p.870, L.6.) At

Walgreens, she got into his truck and the two drove to get gas. (Tr., p.870, Ls.17-25.) They then
went to a housing subdivision and had sex. (Tr., p.871, Ls.4-16.) Hannah called her mother and
asked her where she was, because Hannah had seen her mother's car parked at Walgreens.
6

(Tr., p.871, L.25

p.872, L.12.) Kandi told her daughter that she was driving around with a

friend. (Tr., p.872, Ls.13-16.)
Hannah called her father and told him that Kandi was at Walgreens. (Tr., p.2462, Ls. I 014.) She testified that Mr. Hall was not mad when she told him. (Tr., p.2462, Ls.13-14.) Rob
then called Kandi while she was still driving around with Mr. Corrigan. (Tr., p.873, Ls.7-12.)
Rob asked his wife what she was doing and who she was with, and she told him she was driving
with Emmett.

(Tr., p.873, Ls.13-23.)

Emmett then took the phone and spoke with Rob.

(Tr., p.873, L.25 - p.874, L. 10.) During the conversation, Kandi heard Emmett state, "Y cah,
fucking crack your head," or "Yeah, I'm going to crack your fucking head." (Tr., p.875, Ls.1-3,
p.945, Ls.3-9.)

He also told Rob, "Yeah, just wait there.

We'll be there in a minute."

(Tr., p.875, Ls.7-8.) They then arrived back at the Walgreens. (Tr., p.875, Ls.17-22.)
Mr. Corrigan pulled his truck into the Walgreens parking lot, and he and Ms. Hall got out
of the truck. (Tr., p.877, Ls.4-22.) Emmett left the truck running and his door open. (Tr., p.877,
L.18 - p.878, L.8.) Kandi saw her husband sitting in his truck in the parking lot, and Mr. Hall
got out of his truck. (Tr., p.877, Ls.11-22.) Rob approached Emmett, and the two began to
argue. (Tr., p.877, L.23 -- p.878, L. 18.) Kandi testified that Emmett insulted Rob about how
little money he made compared to how much money he and Kandi were making together.
(Tr., p.879, Ls.13-17.) He told Rob that Kandi did not want to be with him; Rob responded by
pointing out to Emmett that he had five children and a wife at home (Ashlee had just had a
baby).

(Tr., p.879, Ls.6-10, p.881, Ls.12-22.)

Kandi testified that Emmett's eyes became

enormous, and he lunged at and pushed Rob. (Tr., p.881, L.23

p.882, L.4.)

Ms. Hall testified that she stated, "That's enough," and told Rob they should go home,
she then started walking towards her car, and could no longer see Mr. Hall or Mr. Corrigan.
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(Tr., p.882, Ls.5-22.)

She testified that she heard scuffling on the ground behind her.

(Tr., p.882, Ls.22-25.) As she waited for a car to go by, she heard gunshots. (Tr., p.883, Ls.1-4.)
Sarah Johnson, who lived close to the Walgreens, was telling her son good night when
she heard the gunshots, one shot followed by two more shots. (Tr., p.467, L.15 - p.474, L.5.)

Ms. Hall also told the jury that she heard one shot followed by two more shots. (Tr., p.883, Ls.516.) However, Janae Schumacher, who was driving near the Walgreens with her two children,
testified that she heard two shots followed by one shot.2 (Tr., p.404, L. 7

p.411, L.20.)

Meridian Police Department officers were dispatched to the Walgreens in response to a
shots fired call. (Tr., p.562, L.14

p.564, L.3.) Mr. Corrigan was found dead near his truck.

(See Tr., p.627, Ls.13-25.) He had sustained two gunshot wounds, one to the head and one to the
chest.

(See Tr., p.1772, Ls.1-6.)

Both wounds were considered fatal.

(Tr., p.1790, L.21

p.1791, L.3.)
The officers found Rob Hall, profusely bleeding from a head wound, on the eastern side
of the parking lot. (Tr., p.622, L.23

p.623, L. 18.)

He had a grazing gunshot wound to the

head. (Tr., p.794, Ls.5-11.) Detective Jacob Durbin inspected Mr. Hall's head wound at the
hospital looking for any signs of singed hairs or stippling but he did not see any. (Tr., p.13 73,
L.16

p.1375, L.11.)

While at the hospital, Detective Christopher McGilvery chose not to

collect hair samples from Mr. Hall because medical personnel did not observe "any charring or
anything like that." (Tr., p.821, L.20

p.822, L.14.) Flame injury such as singed hair would

indicate that the firearm was fired very close to the target.

(See Tr., p.1773, Ls.11-20.)

"Stippling" describes the small abrasions where gunpowder impacts the skin (Tr., p.1775, Ls.I-

2

The sequence of the shots fired is important in that the State theorizes that Mr. Hall shot
Mr. Corrigan twice before turning the gun on himself. (Tr., p.2572, Ls.15-24.) The State had to
rely upon these lay witnesses because none of the experts testified that the physical evidence
supports this theory. See generally Tr.
8

8), and would indicate that a firearm was fired from about four inches to two feet from the
gunshot wound (Tr., p.1822, Ls.6-18).
The jury heard that, in the professional opinion of defense
Mr. Hall had suffered a traumatic brain injury. (Tr., p.2419,

Dr. Robert Friedman,
17.) Dr. Friedman

fied

that Mr. Hall had evidence of retrograde and anterograde amnesia as a result of the brain injury. 3
(Tr., p.2423, Ls.10-17.) Detective Durbin, who interviewed Rob at the hospital, described his
manner of speech as, "Very, very slow, very dull, sort of thick-tongued. He didn't sound good."
(Tr., p.1371, Ls.12-15.) He had been given morphine. (Tr., p.820, Ls.2-4.) Rob told the police
that he had been shot in the neck, and that his wife's boss shot him. (Tr., p.791, Ls.12-18.) He
also stated that his gun had fallen out of his pocket, that he and Mr. Corrigan fought for the gun,
and that he did not know who shot Emmett. (Tr., p.791, L.19-p.792, L.21.)
Mr. Hall had an Idaho concealed weapon permit, and

carried a weapon with him all

the time. (Tr., p.927, L.18 - p.928, L.11.) While he usually carried a Glock handgun (see
Tr., p.1334, Ls.3-6), Kandi Hall had bought him a Ruger handgun as a Christmas gift several
years prior. (Tr., p.927, Ls.8-17.)

Officers found the Ruger at the scene. (Tr., p.510, L.3 -

p.511, L.6, p.838, Ls.14-20.) A holster was found in Mr. Hall's truck. (Tr., p.1401, L.6 p.1403, L.5.) There was damage to the plastic housing on the Ruger consistent with it being
dropped on pavement. (Tr., p.2286, Ls.9-24.)
Kandi Hall was hysterical when officers arrived and they directed her to sit in a patrol car
to get out of the cold. (Tr., p.1004, L.19 - p.1005, L.5.)

Over the course of the night, Kandi

told the police that she ran into Mr. Corrigan at Walgreens while she was picking up a
prescription, went with him to get gas, and met her husband in the parking lot when they

Retrograde amnesia refers to the loss of prior memories because of a brain injury, while
anterograde amnesia refers to the inability to lay down new memories after a brain injury.
(Tr., p.2420, L.6 -p.2421, L.5.)
3
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returned to Walgreens.

(Tr., p.1005, L.23

p.1006, L.13.) The three talked, and when she

turned to leave to get back to her children at home, she heard three gunshots and turned around
to find that both Rob and Emmett had been shot (Tr., p.1007, Ls.5-15.) She told the police that
she heard two shots followed by one shot. (Tr., p.1188, Ls.3-10.) In a later interview at the
police station, Kandi stated that Rob had confronted Emmett, and that the argument was just
verbal. (Tr., p.1013, L.17

p.1015, L.19.) She related that Emmett was verbally aggressive and

challenged Rob to hit him. (Tr., p.1184, Ls.19-25.) She denied having a romantic relationship
with Emmett. (Tr., p.1187, Ls.6-10.)
Inside Mr. Corrigan's truck, police found prescription bottles filled in the names of
Emmett Corrigan and Jason Blackwell, Emmett's brother, and some of the bottles contained
prescription pills. (Tr., p.2097, L.11 - p.2098, L.16.) The pills contained steroids. (Tr., p.2234,
L.20

p.2236, L.17.) Mr. Corrigan's urine tested positive for the presence of amphetamine and

the illicit steroids Dianabol and stanozolol. (Tr., p. 2225, Ls.4-25, p.2228, Ls.8-18.)
Mr. Hall was charged by Amended Indictment with one count of first-degree murder, in
violation ofidaho Code§§ 18-4001, 18-4002 and 18-4003(a), and one count of use of a deadly
weapon during the commission of a crime, in violation of LC.§ 19-2520. (R., pp.236-37.)
After the parties filed various motions, the district comi issued a Memorandum Decision
and Order Re: Compendium of Motions. (R., pp.1106-39.) Mr. Hall had requested that the
district court admit evidence of Mr. Corrigan's Facebook statements indicating his desire to fight
a male with whom he had an altercation in February 2011. (Sealed Exs., p.74.) The district
court decided that evidence of the Facebook statements would not be admitted "because it is both
hearsay evidence and irrelevant pursuant to I.R.E. 403." (R., p.1121.)
Mr. Hall submitted a proposed jury instruction on justifiable homicide, which included a
provision based on LC. § 18-4009(1) stating that a homicide is justifiable if the homicide "was
10

committed while resisting an attempt to do great bodily injury upon any person, including the
defendant." (R., p.1237.) Mr. Hall asserted that subsection (1) of Section 18-4009 covered a
different circumstance than the circumstances covered by subsections (2) and (3) of the statute;
while subsections (2) and (3) addressed fears of prospective harm, subsection (1) addressed
situations where the "'attempt to ... do great bodily injury' was in progress." (See R., pp.124648.) He asserted that he was entitled to an instruction on subsection (1) because "[t]he facts are
sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to conclude that Mr. Corrigan was in the process of
attempting to cause great bodily harm on Mr. Hall." (R., p.1248.)
The case proceeded to a jury trial. (R., pp.1302-06, 1325-32, 1340-49, 1368-78, 1384-90,
1412-23, 1432-40, 1448-54, 1463-67, 1474-76.)

The State called Ms. Hall as a witness during

its case in chief and questioned her about whether Mr. Corrigan had shoved Mr. Hall and the
sequence of gunshots. (Tr., p.891, L.6, p.894, L.1.) The district court later instructed the jury
that the evidence of Ms. Hall's prior statements could be considered for the purpose of weighing
the credibility of her testimony. (Tr., p.2548, Ls.2-13.)
Along with testimony about the night of the incident, the jury heard testimony from both
sides' expert witnesses. Forensic pathologist Dr. Glen Groben had conducted the autopsy on
Mr. Corrigan. (Tr., p.1765, Ls.12-15.) Dr. Groben testified that Mr. Corrigan had received two
intermediate range gunshot wounds, based on the stippling on the skin and the lack of soot on the
body. (Tr., p.1772, L.l - p.1775, L.16.) Soot only goes a few inches from a fired gun, and
would indicate a contact, near contact, or close range gunshot wound.
p.1774, L.2.)

(Tr., p.1773, L.21 -

Intermediate range gunshot wounds involve the weapon being fired relatively

close to the target, from within inches to two feet away. (See Tr., p.1774, Ls.7-15.)
However, Dr. Groben was unable to determine which of the two gunshot wounds
Mr. Corrigan sustained first. (Tr., p.1795, Ls.5-15.) Dr. Groben testified that he could come up
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with multiple scenanos where either gunshot was first and the other one was second.
(Tr., p.2479, L.22

p.2480, L.18.)

Dr. Graben vvas also unable to tell, based on the chest

entrance wound, what Mr. Corrigan was doing at the time he was shot in the chest. (Tr., p.1796,
Ls.4-7.) On Mr. Corrigan's left hand, he saw abrasions on the knuckles which looked fresh.
(Tr., p.1847, Ls.15-25.)
Thomas Morgan, who had tested the gunshot residue and gunpowder residue, testified
that his muzzle-to-target range determination for the chest gunshot wound was between two and
three feet. (Tr., p.1553, L.22 - p.1554, L.5.) The State's blood expert, Tom Bevel, testified that
he did not know where a wound was actually sustained based on where the blood drips start, and
there was no way to tell based on the blood drips at the scene whether Mr. Hall may or may not
have been closer to Mr. Corrigan at the time Mr. Hall was wounded. (Tr., p.1673, L.19

p.167 4,

L.8.)
Allison Murtha was also called by the State and testified that gunshot residue hand kits
had been collected from Mr. Hall, Ms. Hall and Mr. Corrigan. (Tr., p.1518, Ls.18-24.) Gunshot
residue particles were found on the hands of all three of them. (Tr., p.1519, L.9 - p.1520, L.12.)
Ms. Murtha told the jury that the particles could have been from the subject discharging a
firearm, being in close proximity when a firearm was fired, or coming into contact with
something that had gunshot residue on it, and she could not tell conclusively which one of those
things happened. (Tr., p.1528, Ls.13-22.)
During the State's case in chief, the State called Joseph Toluse, a certified Use of Deadly
Force instructor, as a witness.

(Tr., p.1884, L. 15

p.1886, L.3.)

Mr. Hall objected to

Mr. Toluse's testimony on relevance grounds, and the district court initially sustained the
objection. (Tr., p.1890, L.6 - p.1891, L.9.) The State later recalled Mr. Toluse and presented
additional evidence that Mr. Hall had taken Mr. Toluse's class for his concealed carry license
12

application. (Tr., p.2105, L.7 -· p.2107, L.25, p.2110, L.14 · p.2111, L.18.) Mr. Hall made a
continuing objection to Mr. Toluse's testimony based on "the previously made objection," but
the district court overruled the objection. (Tr., p.2113, Ls.9-13.)
Mr. Toluse then testified about the subjects he covered during his concealed carry
classes. (Tr., p.2114, L.18 --p.2119, L.25, p.2124, L.l

p.2129, L.12.) fn the middle of the

testimony, the district court gave the jury a limiting instruction that it was only to consider the
testimony for what Mr. Toluse taught.

(Tr., p.2123, Ls.13-23.)

Mr. Hall objected to

Mr. Toluse's testimony about the requirements for using deadly force and the need to flee from
potential threats, on the basis that the testimony was instructing the jury on legal standards, but
the district court overruled those objections. (Tr., p.2116, Ls.15-23, p.2127, L.8 · p.2128, L.2.)
Mr. Toluse also testified that, "Any firearm should always be carried in some type of holster."
(Tr., p.2119, Ls.18-22.)
The jury heard that, m the professional opinion of defense expert Dr. Pablo Stewart,
Mr. CotTigan's "behavior in the time leading up to and including March 11, 2011, was due in
large part to the steroids and amphetamines that he had been taking." (Tr., p.2244, Ls.11-25.)
The consequences included hyperirritability, mood !ability, impulsiveness, and explosive temper.
(Tr., p.2245, Ls.1-5.)
At the jury instruction conference, the district court offered its own proposed justifiable
homicide instruction, which added a provision stating that "the bare fear of such acts is not
sufficient unless the circumstances are sufficient to create such a fear in a reasonable person if
the defendant acted under the influence of such fears alone." (Tr., p.2502, L.19

p.2503, L.11.)

The State argued that the district court's proposed justifiable homicide instruction "would be
confusing because it's really addressing what's already addressed fully in the self-defense
instruction." (Tr., p.2503, Ls.19-22.) Mr. Hall asserted "there are different scenarios that the
13

jury could consider in trying to decide the case." (Tr., p.2504, Ls.11-13.) The district court later
decided to withdraw its proposed justifiable homicide instruction, "because I think it is covered
in the self-defense instruction. And as I looked at the proposed justifiable homicide instruction,
it really was, it was repetitive.

ft was covered, and I think it's, frankly, less confusing to the

jury." (Tr., p.2526, Ls.11-17.)
During jury deliberations, the jury submitted the following question to the district court:
"W c would like clarification regarding the concealed weapon law. Does the law state how the
weapon is to be carried when a person, such as holstered versus not holstered?" (Tr., p.2615,
L.22

p.2616, L.3.) After consulting the paiiies, the district court gave the following answer:

"No, the law docs not require a weapon to be holstered." (Tr., p.2619, Ls.14-15.)
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Mr. Hall not guilty of first-degree murder,
but found him guilty of second-degree murder and found that he personally used a firearm in the
commission of the crime. (R., pp.1539-40.)
During the sentencing hearing, the State recommended that the district court impose a life
sentence, with a fixed tenn of thirty-five years. (Tr., p.2690, Ls.19-22.) Mr. Hall asserted that,
because he was forty-four years old at the time of sentencing, a thirty-five year fixed sentence
would be tantamount to a fixed life sentence. (Tr., p.2694, Ls.9-16.) He recommended that the
district court impose a unified sentence of thirty years, with seven and one-half years fixed.
(Tr., p.2695, Ls.22-25.)

The district court imposed a unified sentence of thirty years, with

seventeen years fixed. (R., pp.1693-96.)
Mr. Hall filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court's Judgment of
Conviction. (R., p.24; see R., pp.1688-1691.)
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ISSUES
the district court err
it
§ l 8A009( 1)?
homicide pursuant to

to instruct

Jury on

of j

fiable

Did the district court err when it instructed the jury that in order for a homicide to be
justifiable, the defendant must have believed that the action taken was necessary to save
the defendant from the
presented, and that the defendant may only use an
are incorrect statements of law?
objectively reasonable amount of force, as
3.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it excluded Mr. Corrigan's Facebook
statements from evidence?

4.

Did the district court err when it allowed Mr. Toluse to testify about what he taught in his
concealed carry class?

5.

Even if the above errors are individually harmless, was Mr. Hall's Fourteenth
Amendment Right to Due Process of Law violated because the accumulation of errors
deprived him of his right to a fair trial?
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ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Erred When It Failed To Instruct The Jury On The Law OfJustifiable
Homicide Pursuant To LC. § 18-4009(1)
Introduction
Since bet<xe its founding, Idaho has recognized that the homicide of an assailant who is
attempting to commit murder, a felony, or inflict some great bodily injury against any person is
justifiable, and the perpetrator of such a homicide cannot be held criminally liable. Mr. Hall
asserts that a reasonable jury could conclude from the evidence presented that Mr. Corrigan was
presently attempting to cause him

bodily injury, and that he committed a homicide

resisting Mr. Corrigan's actions. Therefore, the district cout1 erred in denying Mr. Hall's request
for a justifiable homicide instruction, pursuant to LC. § 18-4009( 1). Furthermore, the State will
be unable to prove the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
B.

The District Court Erred When It Failed To Instruct The Jury On The Law Of Justifiable
Homicide Pursuant To LC. § 18-4009(1)
A trial court must instruct the jury on all matters of law pertinent to their considerations.

State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 710 (2009) (citing LC. § 19-2132). The court must honor a
party's request for a specific instruction if that instruction is "'correct and pertinent."'

Id.

(quoting I.C. § 19-2132). A proposed instruction is correct and pertinent where: (1) it is a correct
statement of the law; (2) it is not adequately covered by other instructions; and (3) it is supported
by the evidence presented. See id. at 710-711 (citing State v. Olsen, 103 Idaho 278, 285 (1982)).
Mr. Hall requested the court instruct the jury as follows:
Under the law, homicide is justifiable m anyone of the following three (3)
circumstances[:]
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[ 1] The homicide was committed while resisting an attempt to do great bodily injury
upon any person, including the defendant.

(R., p.1237.)4 Mr. Hall's requested instruction on justifiable homicide was taken directly from
Idaho Code § 18-4009(1 ), omitting only alternative ways in which the homicide would be
justifiable. (Compare R., pp.1237, 1245-1247 with LC.§ 18-4009(1).)
The district court impliedly denied Mr. Hall's requested justifiable homicide instruction
by instead proposing its own instruction, which differed significantly from the instruction
proposed by Mr. Hall. (Tr., p.2502, L.19

p.2503, L. 11.) The couri's proposed instruction

included the following language: "the bare fear of such acts is not sufficient unless the
circumstances are sufficient to create such a fear in a reasonable person if the defendant acted
under the influence of such fears alone."

(Tr., p.2503, Ls.7-11.)

The court and the parties

discussed whether the court's proposed instruction (not Mr. Hall's proposed instruction) was
adequately covered in the comi's proposed self-defense instruction, and the defense ultimately
agreed that the court's two proposed instructions covered the same areas, but the defense never
withdrew its proposed instruction..

(Tr., p.2503, L.12 -- p.2507, L.3.)

The court ultimately

refused to give any instruction on justifiable homicide law, finding the law was adequately
covered in the self-defense instruction. (Tr., p.2526, Ls. l 0-17.)

1.

Mr. Hall's Proposed Instruction Is A Correct Statement Of The Law

Under any statutory analysis, Mr. Hall's requested instruction was a correct statement of
the law. (See R., pp.1237-1238, 1245-1249.) Mr. Hall's proposed instruction was taken directly
from the language contained in J.C. § 18-4009(1). (Compare R., p.1237 with I.C. § 18-4009.)

"It is not an error to give jury instructions that mirror the language of the statute related to the

4

Mr. Hall's proposed instruction on justifiable homicide contained a second and third
subsection, and he also proposed instructions on other areas of the law. (R., pp.1229-1255.)
Mr. Hall does not challenge the district court's ruling on any of his other proposed
jury instructions.
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crime." 5,'tate v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 477 (2012) (citing Holland v. Peterson, 95 Idaho 728
(1974)). "Homicide is ... justifiable when committed by any person ... resisting any attempt to
murder any person, or to commit a felony, or to do some great bodily injury upon any person."
LC. § 18-4009(1 ). Simply put, Idaho law declares that a homicide committed in response to an
actual, on-going attempt by a perpetrator to commit serious bodily injury upon the accused is
justifiable, and Mr. Hall's requested instruction mirrors Idaho law.
a.

By Its Plain Language, LC. § 18-4009 Distinguishes Between Actions
Taken In Response To An Actual, On-Going Violent Attack, And Actions
Taken In Response To An Anticipated Violent Attack

"The language of a statute should be given its plain, usual and ordinary meaning. Where
a statute is clear and unambiguous, the expressed intent of the legislature shall be given effect
without engaging in statutory construction. The literal words of a statute are the best guide to
determining legislative intent." LC. § 73-113(1). By its plain language, LC. § 18-4009(1) states
that a homicide committed in response to an actual on-going violent attack against any person is
justified.

LC. § 18-4009(1).

A person who commits a justifiable homicide cannot be held

criminally liable. LC.§ 18-4013.
Idaho Code § 18-4009 describes four scenarios5 in which a homicide is justified and
reads, in its entirety, as follows:
Homicide is also justifiable when committed by any person m either of the
following cases:
1. When resisting any attempt to murder any person, or to commit a felony, or to
do some great bodily injury upon any person; or,
2. When committed in defense of habitation, property or person, against one who
manifestly intends or endeavors, by violence or surprise, to commit a felony, or
against one who manifestly intends and endeavors, in a violent, riotous or
tumultuous manner, to enter the habitation of another for the purpose of offering
violence to any person therein; or,

5

Subsection (4) is not relevant to the cmTent appeal.
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3. When committed in the lawful defense of such person, or of a
or husband,
is reasonable
parent, child, master, mistress or servant of such person, when
ground to apprehend a design to commit a
or to do some
bodily
injury, and imminent danger of such design being accomplished; but such
or the person in whose behalf the defense was made, if he was the assailant or
engaged in mortal combat, must really and in good faith have endeavored to
decline any further struggle before the homicide was committed; or,
4. When necessarily committed in attempting, by lawful ways and means, to
apprehend any person for any felony committed, or in lawfully suppressing any
riot, or in lawfully keeping and preserving the peace.

LC. § 18-4009 (emphasis added).

By its plain language, the statute describes four separate

scenarios in which a homicide may be justifiable. Id. Subsection (1) describes an actual, ongoing attack, has no requirement that the person's actions be reasonable and stem solely from
fear. LC. § 18-4009( l ). Any homicide committed in response to an actual "attempt to ... do
some great bodily injury upon any person" is justified, and any person who acts in such a manner
cannot be held criminally liable. LC. §§ 18-4009(1), 18-4013 ("The homicide appearing to be
justifiable or excusable, the person indicted must, upon his trial, be fully acquitted and
discharged").
Subsection (2) describes an anticipated attack against habitation, property or person
("against one who manifestly intends or endeavors ... against one who manifestly intends and
endeavors"), and again has neither a "reasonableness" nor a "fear" requirement within the
language of the statute itself. LC. § 18-4009(2). Subsection (3) also describes an anticipated
attack ("imminent danger of such design being accomplished"), but contains a reasonableness
requirement ("when there is reasonable ground to apprehend a design to commit a felony or to do
some great bodily injury"), and is not available in all circumstance ("but such person, or the
person in whose behalf the defense was made, if he was the assailant or engaged in mortal
combat, must really and in good faith have endeavored to decline any further struggle before the
homicide was committed.") LC. § 18-4009(3).
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Idaho Code § 18-4010 modifies subsections (2) and (3) of J.C. § 18-4009 and reads as
follows:
A bare fear of the commission of any of the offenses mentioned in subdivisions 2
and 3 of the preceding section, to prevent which homicide may be lawfully
committed, is not sufficient to justify it. But the circumstances must be sufficient
to excite the fears of a reasonable person, and the party killing must have acted
under the influence of such fears alone.
LC. § 18-4010 (emphasis added). Thus, where the homicide is committed in response to an
anticipated attack as described in I.C. §§ 18-4009(2) or (3), a bare fear of the commission of the
offense is not sufficient, the fear must be objectively reasonable, and the killing must have been
motivated solely by those objectively reasonable fears. I.C. §§ 18-4009(2)-(3); 18-4010.
Notably, the Idaho legislature specifically omitted from LC. § 18-4010 the requirement
that the defendant be motivated solely by an objectively reasonable fear, or even have any fear at
all, when a violent attack is actually occurring. LC. § 18-4009(1); LC. § 18-4010. According to
the plain, usual and ordinary meaning of the words contained in the statutes at issue, Idaho
Code § 18-4009 distinguishes between homicides committed in response to an actual, on-going
attack, where there is neither a reasonableness nor a fear requirement, and homicides committed
in response to anticipated attacks, where a defendant must be act solely out of an objectively
reasonable fear, in order to justify a homicide. LC. §§ 18-4009, 18-4010.
Because Idaho Code § 18-4009(1) makes it clear that a homicide is justifiable when
committed while "resisting any attempt to ... do some great bodily injury upon any person,"
Mr. Hall's proposed instruction was a correct statement of the law.
b.

Historically, A Homicide Committed In Response To An Actual OnGoing Violent Attack Against A Person Has Always Been Justified In
Idaho, Regardless Of Whether The Person Who Committed The Homicide
Was Afraid And Acted "Reasonably"

A historical review of Idaho law on justifiable homicide quells any doubt about the
statute's meaning. "The common law of England, so far as it is not repugnant to, or inconsistent
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with, the constitution or laws of the United States, in all cases not provided for in these compiled
laws, is the rule of decision in all courts of this state." I.C. § 73-116. To the extent necessary,
Idaho courts may review the common law to determine the meaning of statutes. See State v.

Pina, 149 Idaho 140, 143 (2010), abrogated on other grounds by Verska v. St. Alphonsus
Regional lvfedical Center, 151 Idaho 889 (2011 ).
According to Blackstone, "such homicide as is committed for the prevention of any
forcible and atrocious crime, is justifiable by the law of nature; and also by the law of
England .... " 3 T. COOLEY, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES ON THE LA ws OF ENGLAND, Book
IV, p. 180 (3 rd ED. Rev. 1884).

"If any person attempts a robbery or murder of another ... and

shall be killed in such attempt, the slayer shall be acquitted and discharged." Id. "For the one
uniform principle that runs through our own, and all other laws, seems to be this: That where a
crime itself is capital, is endeavored to be committed by force, it is lawful to repel that force by
the death of the party attempting." Id.
When Idaho became a State, this basic principle was enumerated within the Idaho
Constitution itself. Article I,§ 1 of the Idaho Constitution reads as follows:
All men are by nature free and equal, and have certain inalienable rights, among
which are enjoying and defending life and liberty; acquiring, possessing and
protecting property; pursuing happiness and securing safety.
IDAHO CONST. Art.I, § 1 ( emphasis added). This section, entitled "Inalienable rights of man,"
was so uncontroversial that it passed without debate during the Constitutional Convention.
PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE IDAHO CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF IDAHO 1889 (L.W.
Hart, ed., 1912), p.128. Furthermore, other than being re-numbered numerous times, Idaho's
statute on justifiable homicide reads the same today as it read when Idaho's first state legislature
decided what constitutes justifiable homicide. See Idaho Rev. St. §§ 6570, 6571 (1887); Idaho
Rev. Code§§ 6570, 6571 (1908); Comp. Laws of Idaho §§6570, 6571 (1918); Idaho Comp. St.
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§§ 8219, 8220 (1919); I.C. §§ 17-1111, 17-1112 (1932); LC.§§ 18-4009, 18-4010 (1972). In
short, fdaho has always distinguished between a homicide committed in response to an on-going
violent attack, and a homicide committed in response to an anticipated attack.
C.

Idaho Court Decisions Arc Not Inconsistent With The Idaho Legislature's
Definition Of Justifiable Homicide

Mr. Hall acknowledges that multiple Idaho cases make statements suggesting that

justifiable homicide has an element of objective reasonableness in the actions taken or in the
purported fear in all circumstances; however, none of those judicial statements are based upon an
analysis of LC. § 18-4009(1) or its predecessors. See State v. Turner, 136 Idaho 629, 633-34
(Ct. App. 200 l) (citing LC. § 18-4009(3) (but not LC. § 18-4009(1 )), and State v. Rodriguez, 93
Idaho 286 (1969)); Rodriguez, 93 Idaho at 291 (citing State v. Wilson, 41 Idaho 616,243 P. 359
(1925)); State v. Jurica, 42 Idaho 319, _ , 245 P. 685,689 (1926) (no citation to Idaho statute);

Wilson 41 Idaho at

243 P. at 363-364 (citing State v. Grover, 35 Idaho 589, 207 P. 1080

(I 922)); State v. Dunlap, 40 Idaho 630, _ , 235 P. 432, 434 (1925) (no citation to Idaho statute)

Grover, 35 Idaho at ___, 207 P. at 1083 (no citation to Idaho statute); State v. Fleming, 17 Idaho
471, __, 106 P. 305, 309-310 (1910) (citing Id. Rev. Code§ 6570(2)-(3) (but not Id. Rev.
Code§ 6570(1))); State v. McGreevey, 17 Idaho 453, _ , 105 P. 1047, 1051 (1909) (no citation
to Idaho statute).

These court decisions make broad declarations about Idaho's justifiable

homicide law, without actually analyzing the words contained in LC. § 18-4009(1) and its
predecessors.
To the extent that these cases could be viewed as attempts to define the law of justifiable
homicide, they are inconsistent with an Idaho Supreme Court decision that preceded all of them,
and which actually relies upon the language contained in LC. § 18-4009(1)'s predecessor. In
State v. Crea, 10 Idaho 88, 76 P. 1013 (1904), the Court reversed a manslaughter conviction
finding the following instruction to be incorrect: "there must have been shown by the evidence
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to have been a serious and highly provoking injury inflicted upon the person killing ... or an
attempt by the person killed to commit a serious injury on the person killing." Id. 76 P. at 1017.
The Court relied upon Idaho Rev. Stat. § 6570(1), (3) (1887), the verbatim predecessor to
LC.§ 18-4009(1), (3), and found that "the vice of the instruction is in charging that one who kills
another while resisting an attempt to commit a serious injury on his person is guilty of
manslaughter, when as a matter of fact such killing would be justifiable." Id. In other words, no
showing of a "serious and highly provoking injury on the person killing" is required when one
commits a homicide in defense of any person actually suffering an attempt to commit serious
bodily injury upon them. Rather than making the law itself: the Crea Court interpreted the law
passed by the duly elected state legislature.
d.

Idaho Code§§ 18A009 and 18-4010 Cannot Be Interpreted As Requiring
An Objectively Reasonable Fear Element Without Rendering All Or
Portions Of Those Statutes Null

"If a statute is capable of more than one (1) conflicting construction, the reasonableness

of the proposed interpretations shall be considered, and the statute must be construed as a whole.
Interpretations which would render the statute a nullity, or which would lead to absurd results,
are disfavored." I.C. § 73-113(2). In order for this Court to interpret LC. § 18-4009 to limit
homicides which are justifiable to only those where there is an objectively reasonable fear, this
Court would either have to, in essence, delete subsection (1) from LC. § 18-4009, delete the
portion of LC. § 18-4010 that references I.C. §§ 18-4009(2) and (3), or both.
As noted above, the plain language of J.C. § 18-4009(1) has no requirement that the
defendant be acting solely out of fear, let alone that the fear be objectively reasonable. See
J.C.§ 18-4009(1). Idaho Code § 18-4010 specifically references "subdivisions 2 and 3 of the
preceding section" and requires that where a defendant claims a homicide is justifiable in those
situations, "the circumstances must be sufficient to excite the fears of a reasonable person, and
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the party killing must have acted under the influence of such fears alone." I.C §18-4010. The
only way to read these two statutes together and conclude that an objectively reasonable fear be
present in every circumstance, is to imagine that I.C. § 18-4009(1 ), or the language "subdivisions
2 and 3" in I.C. § 18-4010, are not actually contained in the statutes. This, of course, is absurd

and would result in rendering those portions of the statutes a nullity. Idaho courts do not possess
the authority to amend Idaho statutes in this manner.
e.

This Court Docs Not Possess The Constitutional Authority To Amend
Idaho's Justifiable Homicide Laws

It is quite possible that Idaho citizens would no longer find a homicide committed "when
resisting any attempt to ... commit a felony," to be justifiable, absent an objectively reasonable

fear of serious bodily injury on the part of the person committing the homicide. At the time the

j ustifiablc homicide statute was first adopted, most felonies were punishable by death and, thus,
were consistent with Blackstone's description, "That where a crime itself is capital, is
endeavored to be committed by force, it is lawful to repel that force by the death of the party
attempting." Blackstone, supra at 180; see also Pina, 149 Idaho at 145 (citing People v. Aaron,
409 Mich. 672, 299 N.W.2d 304, 310 (1980)). California state courts recognized this problem
and, by judicial fiat, re-wrote California's identical justifiable homicide law. People v. Ceballos,
526 P.2d 241, 245 (Cal. 1974); Cal. Penal Code§ 197.
However, regardless of whether or not judges in California are permitted to re-write
California statutes they find undesirable, it is axiomatic that Idaho courts are not. Idaho courts
interpret the laws passed by the Idaho legislature

they do not enact laws. See State v. Jones,

154 Idaho 412, 418 (2013). The power to correct a socially or otherwise unsound statute lies
with the legislature, not the judiciary. Verska, 151 Idaho at 892-893 (2011). This Court cannot
amend I.C. § 18-4009 and/or LC. § 18-4010 without violating the most basic principle of
separation of powers.
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Furthermore, Mr. Hall's proposed jury instruction omitted language referencing a felony
instructing that a homicide is justifiable if it "was committed while resisting an attempt to do
great bodily injury upon any person, including the defendant."

(R., p.1237.) His proposed

instruction omitted language declaring that a homicide committed in defense of a person
suffering a felony at the hands of another is justified. (R., p.1237.) Thus, even if this Court were
to somehow determine that it has the power to amend the statute on its own to reflect what it
perceives would be the will of the people, there is no reason to believe that the citizens of Idaho
would require a person who commits a homicide while resisting an actual, on-going attempt by a
perpetrator to inflict serious bodily injury upon them, to have an objectively reasonable fear, and
to act only out of that fear.
For the reasons noted above, Mr. Hall's proposed justifiable homicide instruction was a
correct statement of Idaho law.
2.

Mr. Hall's Proposed Justifiable Homicide Instruction Was Not Adequately
Covered By Other Instructions

The district court's finding that Mr. Hall's proposed justifiable homicide instruction was
adequately covered by the self-defense instruction given is erroneous. The court provided Jury
Instruction 33, which reads as follows:
A homicide is justifiable if the defendant was acting in self-defense.
In order to find that the defendant acted in self-defense, all of the
following conditions must be found to have been in existence at the time of the
killing:
1. The defendant must have believed that the defendant was in imminent
danger of death or great bodily harm.
2. In addition to that belief, the defendant must have believed that the
action the defendant took was necessary to save the defendant from the danger
presented.
3. The circumstances must have been such that a reasonable person, under
similar circumstances, would have believed that the defendant was in imminent
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danger of death or
necessary.

bodily

and believed that the action

The defendant must have acted
for some other motivation.

m response to

and not

5. When there is no longer any reasonable appearance of~"""'·"'-· the right
of self-defense ends.
In deciding upon the reasonableness of the defendant's beliefs, you should
detem1ine what an ordinary and reasonable person might have concluded from all
the facts and circumstances which the evidence shows existed at that time, and not
with the benefit of hindsight.
The danger must have been present and imminent, or must have so
appeared to a reasonable person under the circumstances. A bare fear of death or
great bodily injury is not sufficient to justify a homicide. The defendant must have
acted under the influence of fears that only a reasonable person
have had in
a similar position.
The burden is on the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
the homicide was not justifiable. If there is a reasonable doubt whether the
homicide was justifiab you must find the defendant not guilty.

(R., pp.1519-1520.) This instruction is insufficient for multiple reasons.
First, the jury was instructed that it must find "the defendant must have believed that the
defendant was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm." (R., p.1519 (emphasis
added)).

Unlike Mr. Hall's proposed instruction, this instruction simply does not apply to

circumstances where the defendant is actually suffering "an attempt to do great bodily harm"

(see I.C. § 18-4009(1)); rather, it applies only where the defendant believes an attack is imminent
(see LC. § 18-4009(2)). (See R., p.1237.) Second, the instruction requires "that the action the
defendant took was necessary to save the defendant from danger." (R., p.1519.)

Neither

Mr. Hall's proposed instruction nor LC. § 18-4009 have this requirement. 6 (R., p.1237; see also
LC. § 18-4009(1).)

Third, the court's instruction applies an objectively reasonable fear

requirement. (R., p.1519.) Again, neither Mr. Hall's proposed instruction nor I.C. § 18-4009(1)

6

Additional problems with this instruction are discussed in Section II of this brief below.
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have this requirement. (R., p.1237; see also I.C. § 18-4009(1).) Fourth, the court's instruction
requires that the defendant act only in response to the objectively reasonable fear and again,
neither Mr. Hall's proposed instruction nor LC. § 18-4009(1) have this requirement (R., pp.1237,
1519; see also I.C. § 18-4009(1 ).) Finally, the court instructed the jury that "[ w ]hen there is no
longer any reasonable appearance of danger, the right of self defense ends." (R., p.1519.) As
with the rest of the instruction, neither Mr. Hall's proposed instruction nor LC. § 18-4009(1)
have this requirement. (R., p.1237; see also J.C. § 18-4009(1 ).)
Jury Instruction 34 further compounds the harm caused by the court's failure to provide
Mr. Hall's proposed instruction. Jury Instruction 34 reads,
The kind and degree of force which a person may lawfully use in self-defense are
limited by what a reasonable person in the same situation as such person, seeing
what that person sees and knowing what the person knows, then would believe to
be necessary. Any use of force beyond that is regarded by the law as excessive.
Although a person may believe that the person is acting, and may act, in selfdefense, the person is not justified in using a degree of force clearly in excess of
that apparently and reasonably necessary under the existing facts and
.
7
circumstances.
(R., p.1521.)

Idaho Code § 18-4009(1) has no requirement that the individual act in an

objectively reasonable manner, using only the force a jury would think is allowable, in order for
a homicide committed in response to an actual physical attack upon them to be justifiable.

In sum, the district court's instructions does not adequately apprise the jury of the law of
justifiable homicide as codified in LC. § 18-4009(1 ), as Mr. Hall had requested through his
proposed jury instruction. Rather than correctly describing Idaho's justifiable homicide law, as
will be demonstrated in Section II of this brief below, the district court's instruction actually
further misstated the law.

7

Additional problems with this instruction are also discussed in Section II of this brief below.
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3.

The Evidence Presented Justified Mr. Hall's Proposed Instruction

The jury could have concluded, based upon the evidence presented, that Mr. Corrigan
attacked Mr. Hall attempting to inflict serious bodily injury upon him, and that Mr. Hall shot and
killed Mr. Corrigan in response to this attack. The jury heard testimony that on the night of the
incident, Rob Hall was sad, but not angry, while Emmett Corrigan was angry and actually
threatened to "crack" Mr. Hall's "fucking head." (Tr., p.873, L.13 -- p.875, L.3, p.945, Ls.3-9,
p.933, L.23 - p.934, L.7, 1258, L.23 -- p.162, L.l l, p.1330, Ls.11-17, p.2457, L.23

p.2459,

L.18; State's Ex. 77A.) Kandi Hall testified that Emmett Corrigan pushed Rob Hall immediately
before the ultimately deadly confrontation occurred and that Rob did not push back. (Tr., p.881,
L.23

p.882, L.4.)

Most importantly, there was simply no evidence presented that would

counter the claim, definitively or otherwise, that Mr. Corrigan physically attacked Mr. Hall, and
that the homicide was committed in response to Mr. Corrigan's actual, ongoing attempt to inflict
serious bodily injury upon him.

Thus, the evidence presented justified Mr. Hall's

proposed instruction.
C.

The State Will Be Unable To Prove That The Court's Failure To Give Mr. Hall's
Justifiable Homicide Instruction Is Harmless Beyond A Reasonable Doubt
Where alleged error is followed by a contemporaneous objection and the appellant shows

that a violation occurred, the State bears the burden of proving the error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt, based upon the test articulated by the United States Supreme Court in

Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). See State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227 (2010). "To
hold an error as harmless, an appellate court must declare a belief, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that there was no reasonable possibility that such evidence complained of contributed to the
conviction." State v. Sharp, 101 Idaho 498, 507 (1980) (citing Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24).
The physical evidence does not, in any way, make clear what transpired in the Walgreens
parking lot on the night of March 11, 2011.

The State's experts could not give definitive
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answers to the sequences of shots (Tr., p.1795, Ls.5-15, p.2479, L.22 - p.2480, L.18), or even
who fired the gun 8 (Tr., p.1518, L.18

p.1528, L.22). The State's theory that Rob Hall shot

Emmett Corrigan twice before shooting himself is belied by the fact that there was no evidence
that Rob Hall shot himself, i.e., there was no evidence of stippling or singed hair, which arc both
signs of a contact or near contact gunshot wound. (See Tr., p.821, L.20 -- p.822, L.14, p.1373,
L.16 - p.1375, L.11, p.1773, L.11 -- p.1775, L.8.) The jury clearly rejected the State's theory
that Rob Hall's actions were premeditated as shown by the fact that they acquitted him of first
degree murder. (R., pp.1539-1540.) In light of the evidence presented showing that on the night
of the incident Rob Hall was sad but calm, while Emmett Corrigan was angry, threatening, and
specifically drove to the Walgrcens looking for Mr. Hall as mentioned in Section I(B)(3) above,
as well as the lack of physical evidence supporting the State's theory, the State will be unable to
prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that had the jury been given Mr. Hall's proposed justifiable
homicide instruction, it would not have found the homicide to be justifiable.
II.

The District Court Erred When It Instructed The Jury That In Order For A Homicide To Be
Justifiable, The Defendant Must Have Believed That The Action Taken Was Necessary To Save
The Defendant From The Danger Presented, And That A Defendant May Only Use An
Objectively Reasonable Amount Of Force, As Both Are Incorrect Statements Of Law
A.

Introduction
As part of Instruction No. 33, the "self-defense" instruction, the district court told the

jury that in addition to believing that he was in imminent danger, Mr. Hall "must have believed
that the action [he] took was necessary to save [him] from the danger presented." (R., p.1519.)
Furthermore, in Instruction No. 34, the district court told the jury that a defendant can only use
an objectively reasonable amount of force in order for a homicide to be justifiable. (R., p.1521.)

8

It is, of course, undisputed that Mr. Corrigan did not shoot himself.
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Both of these instructions misstate Idaho's justifiable homicide law, which has neither a
requirement that the defendant believe that the actions he took were necessary to save him from
any danger presented, nor a requirement that the defendant use only an objectively reasonable
amount of force. Mr. Hall did not object to these instructions. However, he asserts that these
instructions lowered the State's burden of proof thus violating his constitutional right to due
process, that the errors are plain on the face of the record, and that there is a reasonable
possibility that the errors affected the outcome of the trial.
B.

Justifiable Homicide Under Idaho Law Requires Neither That The Defendant Believe His
Actions Were Necessary To Protect Against The Danger Presented, Nor That The
Defendant Use No More Than An Objectively Reasonable Amount Of Force
As noted above, Idaho's law on justifiable homicide is found at I.C. §§ 18-4009 and 18-

4010. Idaho Code§ 18-4009 reads as follows:
Homicide is also justifiable when committed by any person m either of the
following cases:
I. When resisting any attempt to murder any person, or to commit a felony, or to

do some great bodily injury upon any person; or,
2. When committed in defense of habitation, property or person, against one who
manifestly intends or endeavors, by violence or surprise, to commit a felony, or
against one who manifestly intends and endeavors, in a violent, riotous or
tumultuous manner, to enter the habitation of another for the purpose of offering
violence to any person therein; or,
3. When committed in the lawful defense of such person, or of a wife or husband,
parent, child, master, mistress or servant of such person, when there is reasonable
ground to apprehend a design to commit a felony or to do some great bodily
injury, and imminent danger of such design being accomplished; but such person,
or the person in whose behalf the defense was made, if he was the assailant or
engaged in mortal combat, must really and in good faith have endeavored to
decline any fmiher struggle before the homicide was committed; or,
4. When necessarily committed in attempting, by lawful ways and means, to
apprehend any person for any felony committed, or in lawfully suppressing any
riot, or in lawfully keeping and preserving the peace.
I.C. § 18-4009. Idaho Code§ 18-4010 reads,
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A bare fear of the commission of any of the offenses mentioned in subdivisions 2
and 3 of the preceding section, to prevent which homicide may be lawfully
committed, is not sufficient to justify it. But the circumstances must be sufficient
to excite the fears of a reasonable person, and the party killing must have acted
under the influence of such fears alone.
I.C. § 18-4010. By the plain, ordinary and usual meaning of the words in these statutes (see
I.C. § 73-113(1)), nothing in these sections require the defendant to believe that the actions taken

were necessary to save the defendant from the danger presented.
However, the district court provided Jury Instruction No. 33, which reads, in relevant
part, as follows:

A homicide is justifiable is the defendant was acting in self-defense. In
order to find that the defendant acted in self-defense, all of the following
conditions must have been in existence at the time of the killing:

1. The defendant must have believed that the defendant was in imminent
danger of death or great bodily harm.
2. In addition to that belief, the defendant must have believed that the
action the defendant took was necessary to save the defendant from the danger
presented.

The burden is on the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
the homicide was not justifiable. If there is a reasonable doubt whether the
homicide was justifiable, you must find the defendant not guilty.

(R., pp.1519-1520 ( emphasis added.).)

The portion of this instruction telling the jury that

Mr. Hall must have believed that his actions were necessary to save him from the danger
presented by Mr. Corrigan, in order for the homicide to be justifiable, is an incorrect statement of
law which lowered the State's burden of proof. Simply put, there is nothing in LC. §§ 18-4009
and 18-4010 that states that a homicide is only justifiable if the defendant had the subjective
belief that the actions he took were necessary to protect against the danger presented.
The district court also provided in Jury Instruction No. 34, which reads,
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The kind and degree of force which a person may lawfully use in self-defense arc
limited by what a reasonable person in the same situation as such person, seeing
what that person sees and knowing what the person knows, then would believe to
be necessary. Any use of force beyond that is regarded by the law as excessive.
Although a person may believe that the person is acting, and may act, in selfdefonse, the person is not justified in using a degree of force clearly in excess of
that apparently and reasonably necessary under the existing facts and
circumstances.
(R., p.1521.) Again, there is nothing in LC.§§ 18-4009 and 18-4010 that states that a defendant
may only use the amount of force "a reasonable person in the same situation" would feel is
necessary, nor that a homicide may not be justifiable if jurors later decide that the defendant used
an excessive amount of force. In short, these instructions incorrectly state Idaho's justifiable
homicide law.
C.

Jury [nstructions 33 and 34 Constitute Fundamental Error Under The Facts Of This Case
This Court may review un-objecte<l to jury instructions under Idaho's fundamental error

rule. State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 472-473 (citing State v. Johnson, 145 Idaho 970 (2008)).
"The Peny fundamental etTor test requires the defendant to show three things: (1) the alleged
etTor violated an unwaived constitutional right; (2) the alleged error plainly exists; and (3) the
alleged error was not harmless." Id. at 473 (citing Perry, 150 Idaho at 228). For the reasons
stated below, Mr. Hall asserts that instructing the jury that in order for the homicide to have been
justifiable that he must have believed his actions were necessary to save himself from the
dangers presented by Mr. CotTigan, and that he must use only an objectively reasonable amount
of force were legally erroneous, and that the errors were fundamental.
1.

The Instruction Lowered The State's Burden Of Proof; Thus, The Instruction
Violated Mr. Hall's Constitutional Right To Due Process Of Law

A criminal defendant's right to a fair trial is protected by the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment and Article I,§ 13 of the Idaho Constitution. U.S CONST. amd XIV; ID.
CONST art. I § 13. The Idaho Court of Appeals has observed,
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An erroneous instruction that relieves the State of its burden to prove an element
of a charged crime can be characterized as either a violation of due process,
State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 588, 261 P.3d 853, 865 (2011); State v.
Anderson, 144 Idaho 743, 749, 170 P.3d 886, 892 (2007); see also Sullivan v.
Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 278, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 2080-81, 124 L.Ed.2d 182, 18889 (1993); or as a violation of the Sixth Amendment's jury trial guarantee.
Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. I, 12, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 1835, 144 L.Ed.2d 35,
48-49 (1999); Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 277-78, 113 S.Ct. at 2080 81, 124 L.Ed.2d
at 18788.

State v. Parsons, 153 Idaho 666, 669 (Ct. App. 2012). In order to prove that Mr. Hall committed
either first degree murder, or one of the lesser included offenses, the State was required to prove
both that Mr. Hall killed Mr. Corrigan, and that the homicide was not justifiable. See I.C. §§ 184001, 18-4003, 18-4006, 18-4009.
These instructions appear to be an amalgamation of Idaho's justifiable homicide law and
Idaho's non-homicide self-defense law. Idaho Code§§ 18-4009 and 18-4010 describe Idaho's
justifiable laws. In contrast, Idaho Code§§ 19-201 to 19-203 codifies what constitutes "lawful
resistance" in non-homicide cases. These statutes make clear that a person may lawfully resist
the commission of a "public offense" (LC. § 19-201), that the party resisting may use as much
resistance as is necessary to prevent the offense against his person or family, or to prevent an
illegal, forceful attempt to take or injure his property (I.C. § 19-202), that a person may not be
put in legal jeopardy for protecting himself or a family member by reasonable means, or when
coming to the aid of another he reasonably believes to be in imminent danger of a heinous crime
(I.C. § 19-202A), and that any other person may "make resistance sufficient" to prevent an
offense against any person (LC. § 19-203).
However, the Idaho Supreme Court long ago observed that instructions based upon
LC. §§ 19-202 and 19-203 are not correct statements of the law of self-defense in a homicide
case; rather, "[t]he law relevant to self-defense in a homicide case is LC. § 18-4009." State v.

Rodriguez, 93 Idaho 286, 290-291 (1969). The jury instructions at issue lowered the State's
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burden of proof. While the instructions given by the court may accurately state the law where a
defendant is charged with a non-homicide and claims that he or she acted in self defense, they
arc simply not accurate in explaining Idaho's law on justifiable homicide.
In Jury Instruction 33, the court told the jury that justifiable homicide requires "all of the
following conditions" to be have been in existence at the time of the killing, and that the State
need only disprove one of the conditions in order to demonstrate that the homicide was not
justifiable. (R., pp.1519-1520.) Allowing the State to disprove anything that is not actually a
part of the law of justifiable homicide is the equivalent of not requiring the State to prove the
homicide was not justifiable at all. For example, had the jury been instructed that in order for a
homicide to have been justifiable, it must have been committed on a Monday, the State could
prove that the homicide was not justifiable ifit was committed on a Tuesday. Neither the day on
which the homicide occurred, nor the defendant's belief that his actions were necessary to meet
the danger presented are required for a homicide to be justifiable under Idaho law. Therefore,
the ability of the State to disprove the homicide was justifiable by proving that Mr. Hall did not
believe that his actions were necessary to save him from the danger Mr. Corrigan presented
violated Mr. Hall's Constitutional right to Due Process of Law.
The court giving Jury Instruction 34 is even more Constitutionally infirm under the facts
of this case. As noted above, Idaho law has no requirement that in order for a homicide to be
justifiable, "[t]he kind and degree of force which a person may lawfully use ... are limited by
what a reasonable person in the same situation ... would believe to be necessary." (Compare
I.C. §§ 18-4009, 18-4010 with R., p.1521.) However, this instruction allows the State to prove
the homicide was not justifiable if the jurors found that they would have done something
different.

Even if the jury found that Mr. Hall was actually defending himself from
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Mr. Corrigan's attack, the instruction requires the jury to find him guilty if they found he used a
little too much force. (R., p.1521.)

Mr. Hall's Constitutional right to Due Process was violated both by Jury [nstructions 33
and by Jury Instruction 34.
2.

The Instructional Error Is Plain On Its Face

The instructional errors in this case arc plain on their face, and there is no reason to
believe that Mr. Hall's counsel were "sandbagging" the district court by failing to object to
Instructions 33 and 34. It appears that the district court simply took the jury instructions from
Idaho's uniform criminal jury instructions.

(Compare R., pp.1519-1521 with I.CJ.I. 1517;

I.CJ .I. 1518.) To the same extent that the district court could be excused for incorrectly relying
upon the unifom1 criminal jury instrnctions, Mr. Hall asserts that his counsel should be excused
for failing to object to these instructions. Regardless, the errors in question are matters of law,
not of fact, and are clear from the face of the record, and there is no basis to conclude that
Mr. Hall's counsel knew the jury instructions at issue were incorrect but chose not to object.
Therefore, the instructional errors are plain on their face.
3.

The Instructional Errors Are Not Harmless

Because Mr. Hall did not object to the instructions during trial, he bears "the burden of
proving there is a reasonable possibility that the error[ s] affected the outcome of the trial."

Perry, 150 Idaho at 226.

Mr. Hall asserts that there is a reasonable possibility that the

instructional error in this case affected the outcome of his trial.

In addition to the reasons

Mr. Hall asserts the State cannot prove the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as argued
in Section I(C) of his brief above, the errors in Instructions 33 and 34 in essence relieved the
State of its burden of showing the homicide was unlawful. During its closing argument, the State
argued "We're not here to ask you to like Emmett C01Tigan .... We're asking you to decide that
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he didn't deserve to die." (Tr., p.2609, L.23

p.2610, L.3.) The court erroneously instructed the

jury that Mr. Hall must have reasonably believed that his actions were necessary to save himself
and that, even if he was acting in self-defense, he could still be found guilty if the jury believed
Mr. Hall should have used a lesser degree of force. The jurors were told to find the homicide not
justified if they believed Mr. Hall should have taken some lesser action, such as shooting to scare
or shooting to wound. Had the jurors decided that Mr. Corrigan did not "deserve to die," as the
State asked them to find, the jurors could have concluded that Mr. Hall's actions went "too far"
and he was guilty of murder. Idaho's justifiable homicide law does not allow for the jury to find
that a person acted in self-defense, but second-guess the degree of force the person used in that
defense.

As such, there is a reasonable possibility that the errors contained in the jury

instructions contributed to the jury finding Mr. Hall guilty of second degree murder.
III.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Excluded Mr. CotTigan's Facebook Statements
From Evidence
A.

Introduction
Mr. Hall asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it excluded

Mr. Corrigan's Facebook statements from evidence, because it did not act consistently with the
applicable legal standards. The district court excluded the Facebook statements finding they
were "hearsay" and "irrelevant pursuant to I.R.E. 403."

(R., p.1121.)

But the Facebook

statements fit within the "state of mind" exception to the hearsay rule, and were relevant because
they had a tendency to make it more probable that Mr. Corrigan was the first aggressor. Further,
the probative value of the Facebook statements was not outweighed by the possibility of unfair
prejudice. Thus, the Facebook statements should have been admitted into evidence.
Mr. Hall requested the admission of Mr. Corrigan's "statements on Facebook indicating
his desire to fight a male whom Corrigan had an altercation on or about the middle of February
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2011, and indicating that Corrigan's physical presence caused fear and apprehension in the
male." (Scaled Exs., p.74.)

In February and March 2011, Mr. Corrigan made the following

relevant Facebook statements:
Nothin better than having someone try and call you out and when it comes go
time they end up pissing their pants and not wanting any part of what they started
February 25 at 4:36 am
Yeah Bro! Mine happened last week. Apparently they talk talk talk smack in
Cali. 9 Here in Idaho talk is cheap. Throwin down settles it once and for all!!
February 25 at 4:41 am
"Amen" Brotha. I do have Cali buddies who arc tough as nails (yeah you DC) but
they treat women with respect. Abuse a woman like my guy does and l will come
to your house! Once he has someone his own size he doesn't feel like being
violent anymore!
Fcburary 25 at 4:58 am
So sad seeing people get manipulated by people who abuse, lie and cheat ...
March 7 at 8:59 pm

I would kick their ass, but they are too scared to throw down ... LOL! ! ! ! Next
time I'll film it for ya!!
March 10 at 9: 19 am
(Sealed Exs., pp.74, 115.)
Regarding the admissibility of the Facebook statements, the district court stated, "This
email does not specify who the 'male' is that Corrigan is referring to and is highly speculative
that this desire pertained to the Defendant. Therefore this evidence will not be admitted because
it is both hearsay evidence and irrelevant pursuant to I.RE. 403." (R., p.1121.) However, the
Facebook statements should have been admitted because they fit under the "state of mind"
exception to the hearsay rule and were relevant because they had a tendency to make it more
probable that Mr. Corrigan was the first aggressor.

9

Mr. Hall was from California. (See PSI, p.14.)
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B.

Standard Of Review And Applicable Law
An appellate court reviews a district court's decision to admit or exclude evidence under

a hearsay exception for abuse of discretion. State v. Moses, 156 Idaho 855, __, 332 P.3d 767,
779 (2014). When reviewing a trial court's discretionary decision, an appellate court conducts a
multi-tiered inquiry into (1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of
discretion, (2) whether the trial court acted within the outer bounds of such discretion and
consistently with legal standards applicable to specific choices, and (3) whether the trial court
reached its decision by an exercise of reason. State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989).
"Hearsay" is "a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the
trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." I.R.E. 801(c).
Hearsay is generally not admissible. I.R.E. 802.
The "state of mind" exception to the hearsay rule provides that the following is not
excluded by the hearsay rule:
Then Existing Mental, Emotional, or Physical Condition. A statement of the
declarant 's then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition
(such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily health), but
not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or
believed unless it relates to the execution, revocation, identification, or terms of
declarant' s will.
I.R.E. 803(3) (emphasis added).
C.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Excluded The Facebook Statements
From Evidence, Because It Did Not Act Consistently With The Applicable Legal
Standards
Mr. Hall submits that the district court abused its discretion when it excluded the

Facebook statements from evidence, because it did not act consistently with the applicable legal
standards. The Facebook statements fit within the "state of mind" exception to the hearsay rule,
and were relevant because they had a tendency to make it more probable that Mr. Corrigan was
the first aggressor. Further, the probative value of the Facebook statements was not outweighed
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by the possibility of unfair prejudice. Thus, the Facebook statements should have been admitted
into evidence.
1.

The Facebook Statements Fit Within The "State Of Mind" Exception To The
Hearsay Rule

The Facebook statements fit within the "state of mind" exception to the hearsay rule. The
Facebook statements, while hearsay, fit within the state of mind exception because they were
statements of Mr. Corrigan's then existing intent to be the aggressor in a future confrontation
with Mr. Hall. See State v. Ransome, 467 S.E.2d 404, 407-08 (N.C. 1996) (holding that North
Carolina Rules of Evidence 803(3) "allows the admission of a hearsay statement of a thenexisting intent to engage in a future act").
It appears that whether Rule 803(3) allows for the admission of a hearsay statement of a

then existing intent to engage in a future act is a question of first impression in Idaho. Cases
from the United States Supreme Court and Idaho Supreme Court, predating the adoption of Rule
803(3) in 1985, are instructive.
In Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hillman, 145 U.S. 285 (1892), life insurance companies
defended against the enforcement of a life insurance policy by claiming that the insured,
Mr. Hillman, was not dead but in hiding as part of a conspiracy to defraud the companies, and
that the supposed body of Mr. Hillman was actually that of a Mr. Walters. Id. at 285-87. On
appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed the verdict for the plaintiff-beneficiary and
remanded the case for a new trial, holding the lower court erroneously excluded from evidence
letters written by Mr. Walters to his sister and fiancee. Id. at 294-300. One of the letters stated,
"I expect to leave Wichita on or about March the 5th with a certain Mr. Hillman, a sheep trader,
for Colorado, or parts unknown to me." Id. at 288.

Although the plaintiff-beneficiary had

argued that the letters were inadmissible hearsay, id. at 287, the Court held that "whenever the
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intention is of itself a distinct and material fact in a chain of circumstances, it may be proved by
contemporaneous oral or written declarations of the party." Id at 295.
The Idaho Supreme Court applied the so-called Hillman doctrine in State v. A1uguerza,
46 [daho 456, 268 P. l (1928). In Muguerza, the defendant in an assault with a deadly weapon
case argued that the district court erred in overruling her objections to questioning a witness, one
Carlson, about the complaining witness's statements that he did not want to see the defendant if
she tried to visit him at the hospital. Id. at

268 P. at 2. "In admitting this testimony, the

court limited it to show the attitude of mind of the prosecuting witness towards appellant, she
having testified and offered other testimony tending to show a friendly state of mind on the part
of the prosecuting witness .... " Id. at

268 P. at 2. While ''the questions may have been

objectionable as calling for hearsay," the Court did "not feel justified in holding that the
overruling of the objections amounted to prejudicial error." Id. at _ , 268 P. at 2.

Citing

Hillmon, the Court stated that "[t]here are authorities holding such declarations admissible as
original and competent evidence, wherever the mental feelings of an individual are material to be
proved." Id. at_, 268 P. at 2. "The existence of the true state of feeling of the prosecuting
witness towards appellant became a relevant fact by the introduction of testimony on her behalf
that he exhibited a friendly feeling toward her after the shooting, and the questions asked the
witness Carlson were to repel that inference." Id. at

268 P. at 2.

This Court should hold that Idaho Rule of Evidence 803(3) embraces the Hillmon
doctrine. The exception to the hearsay rule set forth in Hillman and Muguerza is now codified in
the Federal Rules of Evidence. The Commentary to Federal Rule of Evidence 803(3) expressly
embraces a modified version of the Hillman doctrine as part of the federal state of mind
exception to the hearsay rule. Advisory Committee Note on Para. (3) of F.R.E. 803(3) (1972)
("The rule of [Hillman], allowing evidence of intention as tending to prove the doing of the act
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intended, is, of course, left undisturbed."); Advisory Committee Note on Para. (3) of F.R.E.
803(3) (1974) ("[T)he Committee intends that the Rule be construed to limit the doctrine of

[Hillman], so as to render statements of intent by a dcclarant admissible only to prove his future
conduct, not the future conduct of another person."). The language of Idaho Rule of Evidence
803(3) is substantially similar to the language in Federal Rule of Evidence 803(3), and the Idaho
rule should also be read to embrace the Hillman doctrine. See State v. A1cElrath, 366 S.E.2d
442, 452 (N.C. 1988) ("North Carolina Rule of Evidence 803(3) is identical to its federal
counterpart and, therefore, should also be read to embrace the rule announced in the Hillman
case and applied in this Court's own decisions.").
Further, the Idaho Supreme Court has observed that, "While the Idaho Rules of Evidence
were not adopted until 1985, the 'state of mind' exception existed under common law rules of
evidence used in Idaho in nearly identical form to I.RE. 803(3); thus, the analysis remains
similar." State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 364 n.3 (2010). Statements of then existing intent
to engage in a future act should therefore be analyzed under Rule 803(3) using an analysis
similar to the Hillman doctrine analysis used in Muguerza. The Muguerza Court endorsed the
district court's limiting of the Hillman doctrine evidence "to show the attitude of mind of the
prosecuting witness [declarant] towards appellant," see 46 Idaho at

268 P. at 2, much like

Federal Rule of Evidence 803( e) limits the Hillman doctrine "so as to render statements of intent
by a declarant admissible only to prove his future conduct." See Advisory Committee Note on
Para. (3) of F.R.E. 803(3) (1974). Shackleford indicates that Rule 803(3) embraces a similar

Hillman doctrine analysis.

In light of the Hillman doctrine, its use in Muguerza, and its embrace by Rule 803(3), the
Facebook statements fit within the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule because they were
statements of Mr. Corrigan's then existing intent to be the aggressor in a future confrontation
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with Mr. HalL "Limited circumstances exist in which statements made by a murder victim to a
third party are admissible under I.R.E. 803(3)'s state of mind exception to the hearsay rule."

Shackelford, 150 Idaho at 364. "The statements may be admitted only after a determination that
( l) the declaration is relevant, and (2) the need for and value of such testimony outweighs the
possibility of prejudice .... " Id.
2.

The Facebook Statements Were Relevant

The district court erred when it determined that the Facebook statements were not
relevant. The Facebook statements were relevant because they had a tendency to make it more
probable that Mr. Corrigan was the first aggressor. Whether evidence is relevant is a question of
law that an appellate court reviews de novo. State v. Joy, 155 Idaho 1, 6 (2013). "All relevant
evidence is admissible except as otherwise provided by these rules or by other rules applicable in
the courts of this state. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible." l.R.E. 402. The Idaho
Rules of Evidence define "relevant evidence" as "evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the detennination of the action more probable or
less probable than it would be without the evidence."

I.R.E. 401.

"Whether a fact is 'of

consequence' or material is determined by its relationship to the legal theories presented by the
parties." Shackelford, 150 Idaho at 364 (quoting State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437,444 (2008)).
The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that a declarant-victim's state of mind is
relevant because of its relationship to the legal theories presented by the parties "when the
defendant claims self-defense as justification for the killing." Id. (citing State v. Goodrich, 97
Idaho 472,477 n.7 (1976)). "[W]hen examining relevancy, we look to whether the fact that the
statement was made is relevant to a legal theory presented by the parties." Id. at 365.
Mr. Corrigan's Facebook statements were relevant because they had a tendency to make
it more probable that Mr. Corrigan was the first aggressor. Mr. Hall's theory of the case was that
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he acted in self-defense because Mr. Corrigan was the first aggressor. (See, e.g., Tr., p.2598,
Ls.6-7, 17-19.) The Faccbook statements indicate that Mr. Hall was the "male" described in the
statements. fn one of the February 25, 2011 statements, Mr. Corrigan wrote, "Mine happened
last week," (Scaled Exs., p.115), suggesting his confrontation with the male occurred in late
February, which is when Mr. Corrigan confronted Mr. Hall at the Halls' house. (See Tr., p.851,
L.14 - p.857, L.7, p.1242, L.6 - p.1244, L.23.) Mr. Corrigan also stated, "Abuse a woman like
my guy does," and, "So sad seeing people get manipulated by people who abuse, lie and
cheat .... "

(Sealed Exs., p.115.)

Those statements further indicate that Mr. Corrigan's

statements were about Mr. Hall, because Mr. Corrigan believed that Mr. Hall was abusive to
Ms. Hall (See Tr., p.1238, Ls.3-20, p.1244, L.24

p.1245, L. l, p.1299, L.2

p.1300, L.3).

The Facebook statements also indicate that Mr. Corrigan had a then existing intent to be
the aggressor in a future confrontation with Mr. Hall. On February 25, he wrote, "I will come to
your house!" (Sealed Exs., p.115.) That statement suggests that Mr. Corrigan intended to again
confront Mr. Hall at the Halls' house. On March 10, one day before the incident at Walgreens,
Mr. Corrigan stated with respect to the "people who abuse, lie, and cheat" that "I would kick
their ass .... Next time I'll film it for ya!" (Sealed Exs., p.115.) That statement indicates that
Mr. Corrigan intended to be the aggressor in a future confrontation with Mr. Hall.

Thus,

Mr. Corrigan's Facebook statements were relevant because they had a tendency to make it more
probable that Mr. Corrigan was the first aggressor. See I.R.E. 401; Shackelford, 150 Idaho at
364-65.

The district court erred when it dete1mined that the Facebook statements were not

relevant.
3.

The Probative Value Of The Facebook Statements Was Not Outweighed By The
Possibility Of Unfair Prejudice

The probative value of the Facebook statements was not outweighed by the possibility of
unfair prejudice. "As with the admissibility of any piece of evidence, where the probative value
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of the statement[s] is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice ... this evidence
should be excluded."

Goodrich, 97 Idaho at 477; see Shackelford, 150 Idaho at 364.

This

essentially requires an analysis of the Facebook statements under Idaho Rule of Evidence 403,
which allows for the exclusion of relevant evidence "if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice." See LR.E. 403. This inquiry does not center on
"whether the evidence is harn1ful to the strategy of the party opposing its introduction," but on
whether the evidence "invites inordinate appeal to lines of reasoning outside the evidence or
emotions which are irrelevant to the decision making process." State v. Rhoades, 119 Idaho 594,
604 (1991).
The probative value of the Facebook statements was not outweighed by the possibility of
unfair prejudice, because the Facebook statements do not invite "inordinate appeal to lines of
reasoning outside the evidence or emotions which arc irrelevant to the decision making process."

See id. As discussed above, the Facebook statements had a tendency to make it more probable
that Mr. Corrigan was the first aggressor. Any prejudice to the State would not be unfair simply
because the Facebook statements were harmful to the State's strategy. See id.
Further, the district court could have limited the Facebook statements "to show the
attitude of mind of [Mr. Corrigan] towards [Mr. Hall]," see Muguerza, 46 Idaho at_, 268 P. at

2, which would have in tum limited the danger of unfair prejudice. As the Idaho Supreme Court
put it in Goodrich:
A statement which would be pure hearsay as to the truth of the matters alleged is
not made inadmissible thereby if introduced solely to show the declarant's state of
mind and if accompanied by a limiting instruction. This represents a basic policy
judgment that the possibility of misuse of the evidence for the impermissible
purpose, when minimized by a limiting instruction, is a risk worth chancing when
compared to the harms that would likely result from the total exclusion of
valuable relevant evidence.
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Goodrich, 97 Idaho at 478 (internal quotation marks omitted).

The probative value of the

Facebook statements was not outweighed by the possibility of unfair prejudice.
!n sum, the Facebook statements fit within the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule,
and were relevant because they had a tendency to make it more probable that J\fr. Corrigan was
the first aggressor. The probative value of the Facebook statements was not outweighed by the
possibility of unfair prejudice. The Facebook statements therefore should have been admitted
into evidence.

See Shackleford, 150 Idaho at 364-65.

Thus, the district court abused its

discretion when it excluded the Facebook statements from evidence, because it did not act
consistently with the applicable legal standards.
D.

The State Will Be Unable To Prove That The Error Is Harmless
In addition to the reasons articulated in Sections I(C) and H(C)(3) of this brief above, the

State will be unable to prove that the exclusion of the Facebook statements is ham1less beyond a
reasonable doubt.

See State v. Peny, 150 Idaho 209, 227 (2010).

As discussed above,

Mr. Hall's theory of the ease was that he acted in self-defense and that Mr. Corrigan was the first
aggressor. (See, e.g., Tr., p.2598, Ls.6-7, 17-19.)

Had the Facebook statements been admitted

into evidence, would have helped establish that Mr. Corrigan was the first aggressor.
Further, the State amplified the harm by focusing during its closing argument on the
apparent lack of evidence that Mr. Corrigan fought with Mr. Hall. The State argued that the
evidence that Mr. Corrigan and Mr. Hall were seen two feet apart, and that the shot to
Mr. Corrigan's chest was fired from a distance of two to three feet, was "inconsistent with the
theory that those two were fighting." (Tr., p.2573, L.16

p.2574, L.4.) In its rebuttal, the State

also argued that there was no evidence of fighting. (Tr., p.2610, L.13 -p.2611, L.10.) However,
Dr. Groben testified that, on Mr. Corrigan's left hand, he saw abrasions on the knuckles which
looked fresh. (Tr., p.1847, Ls.15-25.)
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In short, the State will be unable to prove that the exclusion of the Faccbook statements is
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

IV.
The District Court Frrcd When It Allowed Mr. Toluse To Testify About What He Taught In His
Concealed Carry Class

A.

Introduction
Mr. Hall asserts that the district court erred when it allowed Mr. Toluse to testify about

what he taught in his concealed carry class, because the testimony was not relevant.
During the State's case in chief, the State called Mr. Toluse as a witness. (Tr., p.1884,
Ls.20-24.)

Mr. Toluse was a certified Use of Deadly Force instructor.

(Tr., p.1884, L.24

p.1886, L.3.) Mr. Hall's counsel objected to Mr. Toluse's testimony, noting that Mr. Toluse
"instructed Mr. Hall some six years ago at the concealed weapons permit training class that I
think the State of Idaho requires." (Tr., p.1886, Ls.21-24.)

I think before we get into it, I want an offer of proof from the state how this is
relevant to anything concerning Rob Hall's actions on March, 2011, and the
allegations that he committed the crime of first degree murder.
The mere fact that this man may have had him in a class, I don't think the
man probably remembers Mr. Hall personally. I may have been wrong about that,
but what does all this have to do with anything that's going to be relevant to the
ultimate issue in this case?
(Tr., p.1886, L.25

p.1887, L.10.) The district court allowed Mr. Toluse's testimony to proceed,

but also stated, "If he doesn't have a recollection of the student or what he taught him about how
to use a firearm, then certainly at that point in time he is not qualified to testify." (Tr., p.1887,
L.11 - p.1888, L.3.) When Mr. Toluse testified that his records indicated that he taught a class to
Mr. Hall, Mr. Hall objected for lack of identification, and the district court sustained the
objection. (Tr., p.1889, L.22 - p.1890, L.5.) After Mr. Toluse testified that he did not know
Mr. Hall and could not identify him in the courtroom, Mr. Hall objected to any further testimony
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because it was "not related to this case." (Tr., p.1890, L.6

p.1891, L. 1.) The district court

sustained the objection, "unless there's some other identification that the witness can provide."
(Tr., p.1891, Ls.2-9.)

The State later had Nora Cole, the concealed weapons specialist for Ada County, testify
that Mr. Hall indicated in his concealed carry license application that he took a class from
Mr. Toluse on November 4, 2006. (Tr., p.2105, L.7

p.2107, L.25.) The State then recalled

Mr. Toluse, who testified that his roster for the November 4, 2006 class indicated that Mr. Hall
took the class. (Tr., p.2110, L.14 - p.2111, L.18.) Mr. Hall made a continuing objection to
Mr. Toluse's testimony based on "the previously made objection," but the district court
overruled the objection. (Tr., p.2113, Ls.9-13.)
Mr. Toluse then testified about the subjects he covered during his concealed carry
classes. (Tr., p.2114, L.18 -- p.2119, L.25, p.2124, L.l

p.2129, L.12.) In the middle of the

testimony, the district court gave the jury a limiting instruction:
Mr. Toluse is here to testify regarding instruction that he gave on the dates in
question. That's a limited purpose of his testimony, is what he instructed upon.
Issues such as self-defense or use of force, the court, at the end of the trial
if appropriate, will give you detailed instructions on those subjects. So do not
consider this evidence other than the limited purpose for which it is being
admitted, and that was what the instruction was.
(Tr., p.2123, Ls.13-23.) Mr. Toluse testified that he taught that all three factors in the "AOJ"
triad 10 must be present before the use of deadly force.

(Tr., p.2115, L.16 - p.2118, L.l.)

Mr. Hall objected to the AOJ triad testimony because it was testimony on legal standards, but the

10

Mr. Toluse testified that "AOJ is ability, opportunity, and in jeopardy." (Tr., p.2116, Ls.1213.) "Ability means that the defender has knowledge that the aggressor has the ability to cause
death or great bodily harm." (Tr., p.2116, L.25 - p.2117, L.2.) "Opportunity means that the
person has the power to immediately employ the ability with a firearm." (Tr., p.2117, Ls.9-11.)
"Jeopardy is the person, is the aggressor acting in a manner which a reasonable and prudent
person would conclude the aggressor's intent is to in fact kill or cripple." (Tr., p.2117, Ls.1619.)
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district court overruled the objection because the testimony was "just teaching in the trial."
(Tr., p.2116, Ls.15-23.) Mr. Tolusc also testified that, "Any firearm should always be carried in
some type of holster." (Tr., p.2119, Ls.18-22.)
Mr. Toi use additionally told the jury that he taught the "SAFE principle," SAFE being an
acronym: "S stands for secure yourself from the threat, A is avoid the threat, F is flee from the
threat, and E is if you must, you have to engage the threat." (Tr., p.2126, Ls.3-9.) He testified
that, "If you can avoid the threat, if you see something that is a potential threat, then you should
avoid it. I'm not going to walk down the street when there's potential danger down that street.
If I'm confronted, then I'm going to flee. I will run, I will beg my way out of a fight, I will do~-

." (Tr., p.2127, Ls.1-7.) Mr. Hall then objected because "[t]hat is not Idaho law. . . . Idaho does
not have any such requirement, and Mr. Toluse's testimony would seem to indicate otherwise."
(Tr., p.2127, Ls.8-12.)

The district court overruled the objection "again with that limiting

instruction. The court is going to give you [the jury] instructions as to the law regarding, again,
appropriate self-defense." (Tr., p.2127, L.23 -- p.2128, L.2.)
While cross-examining Mr. Toluse, Mr. Hall asked whether his class taught "the situation
wherein the person who has the carried concealed permit as is carrying the gun in his pocket or
in his hoodie, but not in his hands, and he is suddenly attacked, the gun falls out of his pocket,
and he's shot." (Tr., p.2132, Ls.4-10.) "What's the reaction? What's the person who has the
concealed weapon supposed to do then when it's knocked away from him and used against
him?" (Tr., p.2132, Ls.11-13.) Mr. Toluse testified, "That's not anything that I cover in my
class." (Tr., p.2132, Ls.14-15.)
During jury deliberations, the jury submitted the following question to the district court:
"We would like clarification regarding the concealed weapon law. Does the law state how the
weapon is to be carried when a person, such as holstered versus not holstered?" (Tr., p.2615,
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L.22

p.2616, L.3.) After consulting the parties, the district court gave the following answer:

"No, the law does not require a weapon to be holstered." (Tr., p.2619, Ls.14-15.)
B.

Standard Of Review And Applicable Laws
As previously discussed, whether evidence 1s relevant is a question of law that an

appellate court reviews de novo. Joy, 155 Idaho at 6. "All relevant evidence is admissible
except as otherwise provided by these rules or by other rules applicable in the courts of this state.
Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible." I.R.E. 402. The Idaho Rules of Evidence
define "relevant evidence" as "evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact

that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it
would be without the evidence." l.R.E. 401. "Whether a fact is 'of consequence' or material is
detennined by its relationship to the legal theories presented by the parties." Shackelford, 150
Idaho at 364 (quoting Yakovac, 145 Idaho at 444).
C.

Mr. Tolusc's Testimony On What He Taught In His Concealed Carry Class Was Not
Relevant
Mr. Hall asserts that the district court erred when it allowed Mr. Toluse to testify on what

he taught in his concealed carry class, because that testimony was not relevant. With respect to
the alleged murder or self-defense, the testimony did not have any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that was of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or
less probable than it would have been without the testimony. See I.RE. 401. Mr. Toluse's
teachings were not relevant to whether any or all of the elements of the instant offense occurred.

See I.C. §§ 18-4001, 18-4002 & 18-4003(a).
Further, Mr. Toluse's teachings were not relevant to Mr. Hall's self-defense theory of the
case. As explained above, under LC. § 18-4009(1) a homicide is justifiable when a violent attack
against the defendant is actually occurring, and subsection (1) does not require that a defendant
be motivated solely by an objectively reasonable fear or have any fear at all. See LC. §§ 1849

4009(1) & 18-4010. Mr. Toluse admitted on cross-examination that his class did not cover a
situation where a concealed carry license holder was suddenly attacked and shot.

(See

Tr., p.2132, ls.4-15.) Thus, Mr. Toluse's teachings were not relevant to the issue of whether
Mr. Hall committed justifiable homicide under Section 18-4009(1).
Nor were Mr. Toluse's teachings relevant to the issue of whether Mr. Hall committed
justifiable homicide under Section 18-4009(2) or (3). A homicide is justifiable under subsections
(2) and (3) if the fear of an anticipated attack was objectively reasonable and killing must have
motivated solely by those objectively reasonable fears.

See I.C. §§ 18A009(2)-(3); 18-4010.

Mr. Toluse's teachings did not make it more probable or less probable that Mr. Hall acted solely
under the influence of an objectively reasonable fear. Thus, Mr. Toluse's teachings were not
relevant to Mr. Hall's self-defense theory of the case.
fn sum, the district court erred when it allowed Mr. Toluse to testify on what he taught in
his concealed carry class, because that testimony was not relevant.

D.

The State Will Be Unable To Prove That The Error fs Harmless
Because the district court's erroneous ruling was preserved by a timely objection, the

State bears the burden of proving the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Additional
harmless error arguments and authority can be found in sections I(C), II(C)(3), and III(D) above,
and are incorporated herein by reference.
The State will be unable to prove that the error in allowing Mr. Toluse to testify on what
he taught in his concealed carry class was harmless. Regarding justifiable homicide, the jury
was only instructed on subsections (2) and (3) of J.C. § 18-4009, which require an objectively
reasonable fear.

(See Tr., p.2544, L.25 - p.2545, L.5.)

"If scientific, technical, or other

specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to detennine a
fact in issue, a witness qualified as a an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
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education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." I.R.E. 702. "In order to
be admissible under I.R.E. 702, the expert's testimony must assist the trier of fact to understand
the evidence or determine a fact that is in issue." State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 66 (2011)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Under I.R.E. 704, an expert's testimony is not inadmissible
merely because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided in the case, but "[ c ]xpert testimony
that concerns conclusions or opinions that the average juror is qualified to draw from the facts
utilizing the juror's common sense and normal experience is inadmissible."
quotation marks omitted) ( alteration in original).

Id. (internal

To the extent that the State offered

Mr. Toluse's testimony as expert testimony to inform the jury's determination as to whether
Mr. Hall had an objectively reasonable fear, that was improper because it concerned
''conclusions or opinions that the average juror is qualified to draw from the facts utilizing the
juror's common sense and normal experience." See id.
Additionally, the jury question during deliberations indicates that Mr. Toluse's testimony
on what he taught in his concealed carry class confused the issues and misled the jurors. See
I.R.E. 403 ("Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issue, or misleading the
jury .... ") The district court instructed the jury that it could consider Mr. Toluse's testimony
only for the limited purpose of what he taught. (See Tr., p.2123, Ls.13-23.) However, the jury
question indicates that the jury thought that Mr. Toluse's testimony covered the legal standards
for self-defense and concealed carry under Idaho law. Mr. Toluse testified that: "Any firearm
should always be carried in some type of holster." (Tr., p.2119, Ls.18-22.) The jury asked the
district court: "We would like clarification regarding the concealed weapon law. Does the law
state how the weapon is to be carried when on a person, such as holstered versus not holstered?"
(Tr., p.2615, L.22-p.2616, L.3.)
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The jury's question on whether Idaho law required a concealed carry weapon to be
holstered, after the jury heard testimony on Mr. Toluse's teachings on how a concealed carry
weapon should always be holstered, indicates that Mr. Tolusc's testimony confused the issues
and misled the jury on the legal standards for self-defense and concealed carry umier Idaho law,
despite the district court's limiting instruction. See State v. Carson, 151 Idaho 713, 718 (2011)
(indicating that the presumption that the jury followed the given jury instructions may be
rebutted, if there is an "indication that the jury did not follow the court's instructions").
Mr. Toluse's teachings went beyond or contradicted Idaho law in many aspects (e.g., the AOJ
triad requirement to use deadly force; the duty to flee), but the district court only clarified that his
teaching on always holstering a concealed carry weapon was not required under Idaho law.
Thus, the jury, having already not heeded the district court's limiting instruction, may have
applied the rest of Mr. Toluse's teachings (and not Idaho law) when it rejected Mr. Hall's selfdefense theory.
Further, the State's closing argument exacerbated the harm by focusing on how Mr. Hall
did not leave the Walgreens. In its closing argument, the State argued that Mr. Hall, "instead of
going home and waiting for his wife~ who according to his daughter comes home every night, he
waited a total of 17 minutes for Kandi Hall and Emmett Corrigan." (Tr., p.2562, Ls.15-18.)
After Mr. Corrigan threatened him with the statement, "I'll break your fucking head," the State
contended, "He has been threatened. Does he leave? No, he waits." (Tr., p.2563, Ls.19-23.)
Mr. Toluse told the jury that he taught, "If I'm confronted, then I'm going to flee. I will run, I
will beg my way out of a fight .... " (Tr., p.2127, Ls.5-7.) But Idaho law does not actually
require a person to flee or otherwise retreat before engaging in self-defense. See I.C. § 18-4009
& 18-4010.
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In sum, the State will be unable to prove that the error in allowing Mr. Toluse to testify
on what he taught in his concealed carry class was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

V.

Even If The Above Errors Are Individually Har111less, Mr. Hall's Fourteenth Amendmer!LBjgh!
To Due Process Of Law Was Violated Because The Accumulation Of Errors Deprived Him Of
His Right To A Fair Trial
Mr. Hall asserts that if the Court finds that the above preserved errors were individually
harmless, the district court's e1rors combined amount to cumulative error. "The cumulative cnor
doctrine refers to an accumulation of irregularities, each of which by itself might be harmless,
but when aggregated, show the absence of a fair trial in contravention of the defendant's
constitutional right to due process." State v. Paciorek, 137 Idaho 629, 635 (Ct. App. 2002). In
order to find cumulative error, this Court must first conclude that there is merit to more than one
of the alleged errors and then conclude that these errors, when aggregated, denied the defendant
a fair trial. State v. Love/ass, 133 Idaho 160, 171 (Ct. App. 1999). Under that doctrine, even
when individual errors are deemed harmless, an accumulation of such errors may deprive a
defendant of a fair trial. State v. Martinez, 125 Idaho 445, 453 (1994). However, a finding of
cumulative error must be predicated upon an accumulation of actual errors. State v. Medina, 128
Idaho 19, 29 (Ct. App. 1996).
Mr. Hall asserts that the district court's errors in his trial amounted to actual errors
depriving him of a fair trial. His arguments in support of this assertion are found in sections
I(C), III(D), and IV(D) above, and need not be repeated, but are incorporated herein
by reference.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Hall respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction and remand his case to

the district court.
DATED this 3 rd day of November, 2014.
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